Exhibit 25

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ase 3:10-cv-03561-WHA Document 1935-27 Filed 05/21/16 Page 3 of 10 Defendant Google Inc. submits the following deposition clips of Larry Ellison played by video on May 13, 2016. Dated: May 15, 2016 KEKER & VAN NEST LLP s/ Robert A. Van Nest By: ROBERT A. VAN NEST CHRISTA M. ANDERSON DANIEL PURCELL Attorneys for Defendant GOOGLE INC. GOOGLE INC.'S DEPOSITION CLIPS OF LARRY ELLISON PLAYED BY VIDEO DURING TRIAL Case No. 3:10-cv-03561 WHA

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Ellison, Lawrence J. (Vol. 01) - 08/12/2011

1 CLIP (RUNNING 00:11:54.273)



💾 Please state your name. ...

ELLISON_4

35 SEGMENTS (RUNNING 00:11:54.273)



1. PAGE 6:05 TO 6:10 (RUNNING 00:00:10.034)

- THE REPORTER: Raise your right hand, please. 06 You do solemnly state that the evidence you 07 shall give in this matter shall be the truth, the whole 08 truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God. 09 THE WITNESS: I do. THE REPORTER: Thank you.
- 2. PAGE 6:13 TO 6:17 (RUNNING 00:00:11.191)
 - Q. Please state your name. A. Lawrence J. Ellison.
 - 14
 - Q. What is your business address, Mr. Ellison? 15
 - 16 500 Oracle Parkway, Redwood -- Redwood City,
 - 17 California.

3. PAGE 9:21 TO 9:25 (RUNNING 00:00:10.351)

- Q. Now, prior to acquiring Sun Microsystems, did
- 22 Oracle make an offer to purchase just some of Sun's
- 23 software assets?
- 24 A. We did.
- 25 Q. And how did that come about?

4. PAGE 10:03 TO 10:04 (RUNNING 00:00:05.044)

- THE WITNESS: I decided to write a letter to
- 04 the Sun board offering to buy their software assets.

5. PAGE 14:12 TO 14:14 (RUNNING 00:00:10.376)

- Q. Now, was the initial offer for software
- 13 motivated at all by a desire to compete with Apple in the
- 14 smartphone business?

6. PAGE 14:16 TO 15:02 (RUNNING 00:01:01.170)

- 16 THE WITNESS: I think there -- certainly
- owning Java would give us the opportunity to develop a Java-based smartphone and Java-based mobile devices or
- 19 expand. In fact, Java was already widely used in mobile
- 20 devices, and our plan was to expand the Java business.
- 21 In other words, we'd like to see it even more broadly
- 22 used in mobile devices.
- 2.3 So since Apple is in the mobile device
- 24 business and we wanted to expand the -- the Java
- 25 business, one sensible avenue for us to pursue would be
- increasing -- the increasing use of Java in mobile 00015:01
 - 02 devices.

7. PAGE 15:14 TO 15:15 (RUNNING 00:00:05.571)

- Q. Was the Java presence at that time primarily
- 15 limited to what are called feature phones?

8. PAGE 15:18 TO 16:04 (RUNNING 00:00:27.634)

- 18 THE WITNESS: At that time? At that time,
- 19 Sun's business was primarily feature phones.
- Q. BY MR. VAN NEST: And so was one of the

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motivating factors, in your mind, Mr. Ellison, the idea
         22
            that you could use Java to expand mobile business at Sun,
         23 including into smartphones?
                     A. Absolutely.
Q. And compete with Apple?
A. Yes.
        2.4
         25
  00016:01
                     O. And did the idea of competing with Google's
         02
         03 Android play any role in the decision to make this
         04
            initial offer?
9. PAGE 16:05 TO 16:10 (RUNNING 00:00:18.053)
        05 A. Again, we had a general notion of expanding 06 the use of Java in the mobile device business, including
         07 feature phones and smartphones, and that -- Android was
         08 in the smartphone business, Apple was in the smartphone
         09 business. So I suppose we'd be competing with both of
        10 them, yes.
10. PAGE 47:05 TO 47:10 (RUNNING 00:00:08.968)
                     Q. And you understand that nobody owns the Java
         06 programming language; right?
         07
                     A. That's correct.
         80
                     Q. Anybody can use that without any royalty at
        09 all?
        10
                     A. Correct.
11. PAGE 57:19 TO 57:23 (RUNNING 00:00:20.160)
                     Q. BY MR. VAN NEST: Now, soon after the deal
         20 was announced, did you indicate that one of the top
            priorities for Oracle was to build a Java phone?
         21
         22
                     A. I said building a Java phone is something we
         23 should explore.
12. PAGE 60:18 TO 61:11 (RUNNING 00:00:52.010)
                     Q. BY MR. VAN NEST: Take a moment, Mr. Ellison,
2042 -
            to review Exhibit 395 and tell me whether or not you
         20 recognize it.
         21
                     A. I do.
                     Q. What is it?
         2.2
         23
                     A. It's an email from me to Scott McNealy
         24 copying Oracle president Safra Catz and Charles Philips.
                     Q. Does it address the building of a Java phone? A. It does.
         25
  00061:01
                     Q. And you say there in the first sentence:
        02
         0.3
            "Scott, I think the best way to increase Java revenue is
            to build a mobile phone application suite on top of
        05 Java FX which will make Apple's iPhone a direct
         06 competitor of ours."
         07
                         Do you see that?
        08
                         I do.
                     Α.
                     Q. Was that your sentiment at the time?
        09
        10
                     A. I think -- obviously, at the moment I wrote
            this, I thought it was a good idea.
13. PAGE 62:16 TO 63:15 (RUNNING 00:01:08.007)
        16
                     Q. And why did you regard this as the best way
            to increase Java revenue? Why was that the case?
        17
        18
                     A. Because there are a lot of -- because I
        19 believe the smartphone -- the smartphone market will be
         20 the largest computer market in the world.
                     Q. And was that your view at the time? A. Yeah.
         2.1
         22
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Q. So you felt the smartphone market was the 24 best way, the best market for Oracle to explore with 25 Java? 00063:01 A. I thought -- I thought it was an idea we had to explore, yes. Q. And at that time, you thought it was the best02 03 idea; right? Because it was the biggest market? 04 05 A. I thought it was the biggest market and it 06 was an idea that needed to be explored, yes. 07 Q. Now, you mention in your email here to 08 Mr. McNealy that Apple is destined to become a major 09 competitor. 10 What did you mean by that? A. Apple at the time was the leading supplier of 11 12 smartphones. 13 Q. So you contemplated building a Java phone that would compete with iPhone. Is that the idea? 14 15 That's correct. Α. 14. PAGE 68:10 TO 68:17 (RUNNING 00:00:30.907) Q. Did you talk with James Gosling about the 11 Java phone idea? A. I believe there were email messages about the 13 Java phone from James where he said Sun -- Sun had 14 thought of that before us. 15 Q. And what did he say about that? 16 A. That for some -- some reason, Sun didn't 17 pursue it. I don't recall what the reason was. 15. PAGE 68:18 TO 68:18 (RUNNING 00:00:03.238) 18 MR. VAN NEST: Let's mark this next in order. 16. PAGE 68:21 TO 68:23 (RUNNING 00:00:05.789) Q. BY MR. VAN NEST: When you've had chance to 22 review this, Mr. Ellison, let me know. 23 Α. Okav. 17. PAGE 68:24 TO 69:13 (RUNNING 00:00:32.800) 2043 -24 Q. And I'm going to be asking you about the



- 25 email at the top of the page. The one below that is the 00069:01 same one that we've been looking at. A. Okay. I've read it.
 Q. So do you remember getting an email from 02 03 04 Mr. Gosling in May of 2009? A. I do. Q. And he told you that, in effect, they wanted 05 06 07 to build a Java phone as well? 0.8 A. Yes. 09 Q. And they couldn't fund it internally so it 10 got nowhere? 11 A. Correct. 12 Q. They went out and acquired a company and that 13 didn't work?
- 18. PAGE 69:15 TO 69:15 (RUNNING 00:00:02.405)
 - THE WITNESS: That's what this says, right.
- 19. PAGE 70:20 TO 71:03 (RUNNING 00:00:28.487)
 - Q. Did there become a project within Oracle
 - 21 known as Project Java Phone?
 - 2.2 A. I'm not trying to be cute with semantics.

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23 There was never really a project. Maybe there was 24 potential project called Java phone. Because we never 25 funded a project. We never had a project, no. We just 00071:01 had discussions, and we decided not to do it before we started a project. 03 MR. VAN NEST: Let's mark this next in order. 20. PAGE 71:06 TO 71:08 (RUNNING 00:00:06.816) Q. BY MR. VAN NEST: Take a moment, Mr. Ellison, 2044-003 to review Exhibit 397 and tell us whether or not you 08 recognize it. 21. PAGE 71:09 TO 71:09 (RUNNING 00:00:04.301) A. I do. 22. PAGE 71:10 TO 71:14 (RUNNING 00:00:18.377) Q. What is it?
A. Again, we were discussing this potential --12 potential project to build a Java FX phone, and this is a 13 review of -- of how we might go about doing that if we 14 decided to go ahead with the project. 23. PAGE 108:11 TO 108:13 (RUNNING 00:00:10.391) Q. Let's go back to Exhibit 397, which is the 11 12 report on the Java phone project. A. Give me a second. Getting close. 24. PAGE 108:14 TO 108:14 (RUNNING 00:00:02.030) 14 Okay. 25. PAGE 110:22 TO 110:22 (RUNNING 00:00:05.141) 2044-024 -Q. Let's go down to page 23. 26. PAGE 110:23 TO 111:03 (RUNNING 00:00:19.008) 2044-024 -It says, "Issues" at the very top of the 24 page, and a list of five problems. Do you see that? A. I do. Q. What is your understanding of what this was 25 00111:01 02 intended to summarize? A. Give me a moment. 27. PAGE 111:04 TO 112:06 (RUNNING 00:01:12.544) The difficulties of getting a -- we deemed it 05 was very important to get a product to market quickly, 06 because, again, Android was -- had a lot of momentum and 07 was getting momentum every day. So it was very important 08 for us to get to market quickly. And the -- it's a 09 complicated project, so these were all of the concerns we 10 had about initiating the smartphone project. 11 Q. And those concerns included that there was a 12 very short time to market? 13 A. We had to get there quickly, yes.

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Q. Right. Many interlinked decisions and

15 deliverables. That's what you meant by complex

14

16 project --

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A. Exactly, yes.
        17
                         -- right?
        18
                     Q.
                         Very limited internal expertise to make smart
        2.0
            decisions.
                         What did that refer to?
                     A. We'd never built a smartphone before. Q. And didn't have the internal staff to do
        21
        22
        23 that?
        24
                     A. Correct. No experience.
        25
                     Q. Each decisions effects others and overall
 00112:01
           cost and price. That reflects the complexity; right?
        02
                     A. Right.
        0.3
                     Q. And delays have an impact on successful
        04 deliver?
        05
                     A. Yeah. Every day that's delayed, Android got
        06 stronger.
28. PAGE 134:20 TO 134:22 (RUNNING 00:00:07.332)
                    Q. So obviously running on Java programming
        21 language with a Java virtual machine, that doesn't ensure
        22 success in the smartphone market; right?
29. PAGE 134:24 TO 135:01 (RUNNING 00:00:05.698)
                         THE WITNESS: Of course not. We decided not
        25 to go into the smartphone market with the Java virtual
  00135:01 machine.
30. PAGE 135:09 TO 135:12 (RUNNING 00:00:10.034)
                     Q. BY MR. VAN NEST: Were there any other
        10 efforts that you made to enter in to this large
        smartphone market, apart from the various ones we've already talked about?
31. PAGE 135:23 TO 136:21 (RUNNING 00:01:20.689)
                         THE WITNESS: We never made an effort to
        24 enter the smartphone market. We analyzed whether we had
        25 a reasonable likelihood of success if we entered the
 00136:01 \, smartphone market and decided, you know, that Android had 02 \, already -- there already was a Java smartphone with a lot
        03 of momentum, and, therefore, we could not enter the
        04 smartphone market.
        0.5
                     Q. BY MR. VAN NEST: You've mentioned that
        06 decision or the basis for that decision a number of
        07 times. Have you seen any documents that actually reflect
        08 that a factor in your inability to get into the market
        09 was Android?
        10
                    A. I haven't seen any documents that enumerate
        11 why we didn't go into the smartphone market.
        12
                    Q. And you certainly haven't seen any that blame
        13 that on Android, have you?
        14
                    A. As I say, I have not seen -- I have not
        15 seen -- again, I made the decision -- it was my decision
        16 to consider the smartphone market. It was my -- you
        17 know, I put it out there, so I made the decision to do
        18 the analysis, and I made the decision to kill it. And I
        19
            don't know if I wrote down -- I've never seen a document
        20 written down that we are not entering the smartphone
        21 market because of this reason.
32. PAGE 151:06 TO 151:09 (RUNNING 00:00:11.250)
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06 Q. And did you present a model for expected Java financial performance to the board back in '09 when you 07 80 made the acquisition? A. Probably. 09

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33. PAGE 151:10 TO 151:12 (RUNNING 00:00:10.082)

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Q. How has the Java portion of your business performed financially against that model in '09 and '10 and so far in 2011?
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34. PAGE 151:14 TO 152:01 (RUNNING 00:00:31.712)

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14
                      THE WITNESS: I think -- again, I think it
      15 was a reasonably conservative board model. And I think
          it's done okay, but I'd have to look at the numbers.
      17 don't know offhand.
      18
                  Q. BY MR. VAN NEST: Has Java revenue increased
      19 since you acquired Sun?
                  A. I believe so.
      20
                  Q. By what kind of factor? Do you know?
      21
      22
                  A. I don't know.
                  Q. Do you know why it's increased? A. We -- we're selling more. What do you mean
      23
      24
      25 by that? We're -- we're selling -- you know, we're
00152:01 selling more of it.
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35. PAGE 153:18 TO 153:23 (RUNNING 00:00:06.673)

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18 Q. So you're doing better in the categories you 19 have?
20 A. Right.
21 Q. And you're expanding to the categories as 22 well?
23 A. Yeah.
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TOTAL: 1 CLIP FROM 1 DEPOSITION (RUNNING 00:11:54.273)

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United States District Court
Northern District of California
TRIAL EXHIBIT 7787

CASE NO. 10-03561 WHA

DEPUTY CLERK

DATE ENTERED_

Service Services